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) 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) Ada Co. Case No. CV-OC-2015-10240 
) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, et al., 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS SARA B. THOMAS AND WILLIAM H. WELLMAN 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District for Ada County 
Honorable Samuel A. Hoagland, District Judge presiding 
Richard Alan Eppink, residing at Boise, Idaho; Jason D. Williamson, residing at New York, New 
York; Kathryn M. Ali and Brooks Hanner, residing at Washington, D.C.; and Andrew C. Lillie, 
residing at Denver, Colorado; for Appellants. 
Steven L. Olsen, Michael S. Gilmore, Shasta Kilminster-Hadley, and Scott Zanzig, residing at 
Boise, Idaho, for Respondents State of Idaho, Hon. Linda Copple Trout, Darrell G. Bolz, Kimber 
Ricks, Sen. Chuck Winder, and Rep. Christy Perry. 
Cally A. Younger, residing at Boise, Idaho, for Respondent Governor C.L. "Butch" Otter. 
Daniel J. Skinner, residing at Boise, Idaho for Respondents Sara B. Thomas and William H. 
Wellman. 
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case stems 
similarly situated in the State of Idaho, are continuously being deprived of their state and federal 
constitutional rights to counsel and Due Process of law" by the State of Idaho, Governor C.L. 
"Butch" Otter, and the Idaho Public Defense Commission ("PDC"). Memorandum Decision and 
Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, p. 1. (R., p. 468.) Respondents Sara B. Thomas ("Thomas") 
and William H. Wellman ("Wellman") are members of the PDC. Appellants allege injuries 
including "ineffective assistance of counsel for lack of representation at initial appearances, and 
attorneys' failure to communicate with them at time, or to file certain motions on their behalf, or 
to properly investigate their cases." Id. at p. 2. Appellants attribute these alleged injuries to 
"systemic statewide deficiencies" in the public defense system. Appellants' Brief, p. 7 (Apr. 25, 
2016). 
The statewide system of public defense in Idaho is controlled by the Idaho Public Defense 
Act (Idaho Code §§ 19-848 through 19-866). The Idaho legislature delegated its duty to provide 
public defense throughout the state to the individual counties. Under Idaho Code§ 19-859, the 
counties are required to administer and fund public defense services. "The natural result is forty-
four different systems with different standards and resources, managing thousands of cases with 
varying quality of services." Memorandum Decision and Order Granting .Motion to Dismiss, p. 3 
(R., p. 470.) The National Legal Aid and Defender Association ("NLADA") issued a report in 
2010 identifying specific problems with the Idaho public defense system. Following the NLADA 
report, the Idaho legislature formed the PDC under Idaho Code § 19-849. The PDC, as initially 
created, only has the power to promulgate rules establishing 1) training and continuing legal 
1 
an § 
was signed into law to go into effect on July 1, 2016. House Bill 504 expands the powers of the 
PDC to set and enforce performance standards and give the PDC power to review and either accept 
or deny county indigent defense grant applications. Idaho Code §§ 19-850(1 )(vi), (vii), and 19-
862A (effective July 1, 2016). Pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 19-862A(2), (11), the PDC can require 
individual counties to address how noncompliance with indigent defense standards will be cured 
in the upcoming fiscal year in their respective state indigent defense grant applications. 
Whether there are deficiencies in the statewide public defense system is not dispositive of 
whether a claim may be brought against Respondents Thomas and Wellman. As longtime 
advocates for an adequate public defense system, Thomas and Wellman understand the challenges 
that exist for public defense attorneys through the state to effectively assist indigent defendants. 
However, Respondents Thomas and Wellman also understand that the PDC lacks the power under 
the current law to effectuate change and remedy Appellants' claimed injuries. 
Appellants argue that "[t]he remedies Plaintiffs seek are fully within the Defendants' power 
to provide." Appellants' Brief, p. 9 (Apr. 25, 2016). However, in regard to the PDC, this claim 
ignores the clear language of Idaho Code § 19-850 which limits the PDC to only have power to 
promulgate rules relating to 1) training and continuing education for public defenders in Idaho, 
and 2) uniform data reporting requirements. The PDC's authority cannot be causally connected to 
Appellants' alleged injuries, nor would a Court order regarding the PDC remedy those injuries. 
Any Court order directing the PDC to act to remedy Appellants' alleged injuries would violate the 
Separation of Powers Doctrine and usurp the authority of the Idaho legislature to enact laws. 
2 
Defendants ("State") have failed to implement actual change on the ground - courtrooms across 
the state - where the liberty of individual Idahoans hangs in the balance." Id. at p. 7. Appellants' 
alleged injuries, however, occurred under the previous (and still current) Idaho Public Defense 
Act. Further, since the legislature has enacted new legislation under House Bill 504 that expands 
the authority of the PDC beginning July 1, 2016, any Court order directing the PDC to act would 
be premature since the PDC has not even legally had the opportunity to act. 
The amicus briefs, and much of the Appellants arguments, focus on whether there is a 
constructive denial claim prior to an adjudication of guilt. Whether or not a constructive denial 
claim exists is not dispositive of the case with regard to Respondents Thomas and Wellman. 
Regardless of whether the claim exists, the Appellants lack standing because the PDC did not 
cause their claimed injury, the Respondents cannot redress the claimed shortcomings, and directing 
the exercise of their newfound authority would violate the Separation of Powers doctrine. Whether 
a constructive denial claim exists does not affect this legal bar to the claims against Ms. Thomas 
and Mr. Wellman. 
B. Procedural History 
On June 17, 2015, Plaintiffs filed their Class Action Complaint for Injunctive and 
Declaratory Relief along with a Motion for Class Certification. (R., pp. 6-54.) On July 8, 2015, 
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. (R., pp.154-155.) On August 21, 2015, Defendants filed a 
Motion for Protective Order Staying Discovery Pending Decision on Motion to Dismiss. (R., pp. 
176-177.) On October 20, 2015, the District Court entered an Order Governing Discovery, 
3 
were 
October 8, 201 the law firm Cantrill, Skinner, Lewis, Casey & Sorensen, substituted as 
counsel ofrecord for Defendants Thomas and Wellman, due to the inherent conflict of interest in 
having the Attorney General represent two active public defense attorneys and the problems 
associated with discovery. Following oral arguments on the Motion to Dismiss on December 16, 
2015, the District Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion to Dismiss 
on January 20, 2016. (R., pp. 468-499.) Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal on January 25, 2016. 
(R., pp. 502-507.) 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Whether there is a sufficient causal connection between the PDC's actions, or inaction, and 
the alleged harm suffered by Appellants, in order to establish Appellants' standing against PDC 
members. 
B. Whether the alleged harm suffered by Appellants is redressable by the Court in order to 
establish Appellants' standing against PDC members. 
C. Whether the relief sought by Appellants against the PDC would violate the Separation of 
Powers Doctrine. 
D. Whether Appellants are entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
1 In Appellants' Notice of Appeal, the stayed discovery ordered by the District Court is listed as an issue on appeal. 
Although this issue is not addressed in Appellants' Brief, Respondents Thomas and Wellman maintain that if 
discovery goes forward in this matter, documents and information relating to their public defense case files must be 
protected by attorney-client privilege. 
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state 
'when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of in support of the claim 
which would entitle relief."' Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535,536,835 P.2d 1346, 1347 (Ct.App. 
1992) citing Wackerli v. Martindale, 82 Idaho 400, 405, 353 P.2d 782, 787 (1960). When an 
appellate court reviews an order of the district court dismissing a case pursuant to Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b )(6), the non-moving party is entitled to have all inferences from the record 
viewed in his favor. Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 126 Idaho 960, 962, 895 P.2d 561, 563 (1995) 
citing Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635,637, 778 P.2d 757, 759 (1989). "After drawing 
all inferences in the non-moving party's favor, we then ask whether a claim for relief has been 
stated." Id. "The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is 
entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Id. citing Greenfield v. Suzuki Motor Co. Ltd., 
776 F.Supp. 698, 701 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). 
"While a complaint attacked by a Rule l 2(b )( 6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed 
factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief 
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 
action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-5, 
167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) citingPapasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265,286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 
209 (1986). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 
level." Id. 
"A l 2(b )( 6) motion looks only at the pleadings to determine whether a claim for relief has 
been stated." Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002). 
5 
B. Plaintiffs Lack Standing Against the Public Defense Commission 
Because neither action nor inaction by the PDC has caused the injuries claimed, and the 
PDC presently lacks the ability to redress the alleged deficiencies, the Appellant's lack standing. 
"One of the controlling elements in the definition of a case or controversy under Article III 
is standing." Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., 551 U.S. 587,596, 127 S.Ct. 2553, 
168 L.Ed.2d 424 (2007) citing ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 613, 109 S.Ct. 2037, 104 
L.Ed.2d 696 (1989) ( opinion of Kennedy, J. ). Idaho has adopted the Article III federal 
justiciability requirement. Noh v. Cenarussa, 137 Idaho 798, 801, 53 P.3d 1217, 1220 (2002). 
"The doctrine of standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues the party wishes 
to have adjudicated." Miles, 116 Idaho at 641, 778 P.2d at 763 citing Valley Forge College v. 
Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 484, 102 S.Ct. 752, 765, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). The Idaho 
Supreme Court explained the standing requirements by stating, "In order to satisfy the requirement 
of standing, the petitioners must allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood 
that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury." Schneider v. Howe, 
142 Idaho 767, 772, 133 P.3d 1232, 1237 (2006). "From Article Ill's limitation of the judicial 
power to resolving 'Cases' and 'Controversies,' and the separation-of-powers principles 
underlying that limitation, [the U.S. Supreme Court has] deduced a set of requirements that 
together make up the 'irreducible constitutional minimum of standing.'" Lexmark Intern., Inc. v. 
Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1377, 1386, 188 L.Ed.2d 392 (2014) quoting Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 36, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). "The 
6 
or 
to 
a 
As Appellants' Complaint applies to Respondents PDC, Appellants lack standing because 
the causal connection between Appellants' alleged injuries and the PDC is too remote and the 
injury could not be redressed by the Court or the PDC. At the time this lawsuit was filed, and at 
the time of this brief, the PDC had no power to control or change the public defense system in 
Idaho. It is only the passage of House Bill 504 that gave the PDC any power to control or change 
the statewide public defense system. However, this bill does not go into effect until July 1, 2016. 
The PDC, until this point, is merely an advisory board with no power to enact or enforce change 
in the public defense system. 
1. Causal Connection 
As the District Court correctly concluded, the connection of the claimed injury to the PDC 
is too remote to be fairly traceable. There has to be "a fairly traceable causal connection between 
the claimed injury and challenged conduct" in order for a plaintiff to have standing. Miles at 116 
Idaho 641, 778 P.2d 763 quoting Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72, 
98 S.Ct. 2620, 2630, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978). Article III requires that a court act only to "redress 
injury that fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and not injury that results 
from the independent action of some third party not before the court." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky 
Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41-42, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1926, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976). 
Under Idaho law, at the time of this lawsuit and the date of this brief, the PDC had no 
power to cause, or alleviate, the injuries complained of by Appellants. To the same effect, the 
7 
(i) Training and continuing legal education requirements for defending 
attorneys, which shall promote competency and consistency in case types 
including, but not limited to, criminal, juvenile, abuse and neglect, post-
conviction, civil commitment, capital and civil contempt; and 
(ii) Uniform data reporting requirements for the annual reports submitted 
pursuant to section 19-864, Idaho Code. The data reported shall include 
caseload, workload and expenditures. 
(b) On or before January 20, 2015, and by January 20 of each year thereafter as 
deemed necessary by the commission, make recommendations to the Idaho 
legislature for legislation on public defense system issues including, but not limited 
to: 
(i) Core requirements for contracts between counties and private attorneys 
for the provision of indigent defense services and proposed model contracts 
for counties to use; 
(ii) Qualifications and experience standards for the public defender and 
defending attorneys; 
(iii) Enforcement mechanisms; and 
(iv) Funding issues including, but not limited to: 
1. Training and continuing legal education for defending attorneys; 
2. Data collection and reporting efforts; and 
3. Conflict cases. 
(c) Hold at least one (1) meeting in each calendar quarter. 
§ 
Under Idaho Code § 19-850(1 )( a), the PDC can only enact rules relating to the training and 
continuing legal education requirements for public defenders and the uniform data reporting 
requirements. Other than those two specific grants of authority, the legislature has only given the 
PDC advisory powers. There is no enforcement mechanism if the rules are not followed. 
8 
Any failure of the PDC to perform its duties pursuant Idaho Code § 19-850, as claimed by 
Appellants, cannot be traced to the broad harm claimed by Appellants. Even taking Appellants' 
claims as actions or inactions PDC did not cause of harm claimed. 
do not fund public defenders, do not control the criminal processes, have no present authority to 
limit maximum caseloads, and have no actual authority which has caused the claimed 
shortcomings. 
The causal connection between any actions resulting in the alleged harm, and any ability 
to redress said harm by this Court, lies with actors outside of the PDC. The independent actions 
of individual counties, which are not parties to this action, are much more closely connected than 
the PDC to the alleged harm suffered by Appellants. Each county has made independent choices 
in its implementation of its respective public defense system. There is no action or inaction by the 
PDC that can be traced to Appellants' alleged injuries. 
Even without considering the PDC's lack of power to cause or prevent the harm claimed 
by Appellants, the actions of third parties outside of this lawsuit break any causal connection 
between the PDC's conduct (or lack thereof) and Appellants' alleged harm. Each county in Idaho 
is delegated the power to oversee and administer its respective public defense system. The alleged 
harm caused to Appellants can be traced to the intervening actions or inactions or the individual 
counties and the individual public defenders. As the District Court concluded, "it is not clear ( or 
even properly alleged) that systemic constitutional violations are occurring in every county." 
Afemorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, pp. 22-23. (R., pp.489-490.) 
2 Although Respondents recognize that for purposes of this appeal, all facts and inferences are to be drawn in favor of 
Appeilants, Respondents note that they vehemently disagree with the characterization and description of the actions 
and lack of actions alleged by Appellants in their Complaint. As the Appellants are well aware, Ms. Thomas and Mr. 
Wellman have both worked vigorously for years with the legislature and others to improve the public defense system 
in Idaho. 
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to 
are much more closely connected to the alleged harm incurred by Appellants. The connection 
between the PDC and the Appellants' harm is far too remote to be fairly traceable. 
There is no causal connection that provides the Appellants with standing to sue Sara 
Thomas or William Wellman. 
2. Redressability 
Coupled with the lack of standing, neither Ms. Thomas nor Mr. Wellman have the authority 
to redress the alleged problems. 
"In order to satisfy the requirement of standing, the petitioners must allege or demonstrate 
an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress 
the claimed injury." Ciszek v. Kootenai County Bd. of Com 'rs, 151 Idaho 123, 128,254 P.3d 24, 
29 (2011) quoting Schneider, 142 Idaho at 772, 133 P.3d at 1237. "[I]t must be 'likely,' as opposed 
to merely 'speculative,' that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision."' Lujan, 504 
U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. at 2136 citing Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43. 96 S.Ct. 1924, 1926. "The 
requirement of 'actual injury redressable by the court' serves several of the implicit policies 
embodied in Article III." Valley Forge Christian College, 454 US at 472, 102 S.Ct. at 758. "It 
tends to assure that the legal questions presented to the court will be resolved, not in the rarified 
atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic 
appreciation of the consequences of judicial action." Id. 
In Lujan, the Supreme Court held: 
When the suit is one challenging the legality of government action 
or inaction, the nature and extent of facts that must be averred ( at 
10 
a 
requmng will redress it. When, as in this case, 
a plaintiffs asserted injury arises from the government's allegedly 
unlawful regulation ( or lack of regulation) of someone else, much 
more is needed. In that circumstance, causation and redressability 
ordinarily hinge on the response of the regulated ( or reg.ilable) third 
party to the government action or inaction-and perhaps on the 
response of others as well. The existence of one or more of the 
essential elements of standing "depends on the unfettered choices 
made by independent actors not before the courts and whose 
exercise of broad and legitimate discretion the courts cannot 
presume either to control or to predict." ASARCO 
Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605,615 (1989) (opinion of Kennedy, J.); 
see also Simon, supra, at 426 U.S. 41-42; and it becomes the burden 
of the plaintiff to adduce facts showing that those choices have been 
or will be made in such manner as to produce causation and permit 
redressability of injury. 
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561-562, 112 S.Ct. at 2137. 
In the case before this Court, Appellants are challenging the system of public defense 
implemented throughout the State of Idaho by the Idaho legislature. That system, under Idaho 
Code § 19-859, delegates the responsibility of providing and regulating public defense to the 
individual counties throughout the State. The PDC did not implement this system. The PDC 
cannot enforce public defense standards. The PDC does not have any power over the counties to 
regulate the administration of public defense. There is no action the Court can take in regard to 
the PDC to redress any alleged harm incurred by Appellants. The power over public defense in 
Idaho lies with the legislature and the individual counties. Like in Lujan, Appellants chose to 
"challenge a more generalized level of Government action," rather than "attacking the separate 
decisions" of third parties. Lujan 504 U.S. at 568, 112 S.Ct. at 2140. The only redress of 
Appellants' alleged injuries requires action by individual parties (the counties) or the funding 
11 
u 
the extent that Appellants argue that the PDC will have additional enforcement nr.,,.,,,,." 
over county indigent defense programs, based on the revisions to the Idaho Public Defense Act 
that go into effect July 1, 2016, such argument is not relevant. At the time of this lawsuit and the 
alleged harm suffered by Appellants, the PDC had no regulatory, funding, or enforcement power 
over the public defense system from county to county. Beginning on July 1, 2016, the PDC will 
have enforcement powers over standards of public defense services throughout the state pursuant 
to Idaho Code §§ 19-850(l)(a)(vi) and 19-862A. However, at the time of Appellants' alleged 
injuries, the PDC had no such power. As Appellants state, the changes to the PDC's powers "if 
actually implemented and enforced, could directly remedy many of the deficiencies identified by 
Plaintiffs in their Complaint." Appellants' Brief, p. 27 (Apr. 29, 2016). Appellants, however, are 
asking the Court to step in and regulate the PDC before it even legally had an opportunity to redress 
the alleged deficiencies. 
Appellants cite Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452,464, 122 S.Ct. 2191, 2199, 153 L.Ed.2d 453 
(2002) in stating "it is enough that the 'practical consequence' of a court decision 'would amount 
to a significant increase in the likelihood that the plaintiff would obtain relief that directly redressed 
the injury suffered."' Appellants' Brief, p. 28 (Apr. 29, 2016). Even without considering the 
speculative nature of Appellants' claimed harm, no relief that the District Court could grant could 
amount to a significant increase in the likelihood that the Appellants would obtain relief that 
directly redressed the injury suffered. As the District Court correctly concluded, the proper process 
for challenging effective assistance of counsel involves bringing a motion in a post-conviction 
12 
a a 
petitioner must first, "that counsel's performance was deficient" and second, "that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687, 104 
S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The appropriate tool for addressing preconviction relief 
would be within the court case itself, before the handling judge. 
Appellants rely on United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 
(1984 ), to show that constructive denial of counsel is redressable by the Court. Respondents 
Thomas and Wellman do not dispute that injuries can be suffered by indigent defendants due to 
constructive denial of counsel preconviction. However, it is only the local court that would have 
any authority to order the public defender to do something in a particular case. Should a defendant 
raise a claim of constructive denial of counsel in a pending criminal case, the handling court has 
the ability to protect the right to counsel because it would have the authority to order the public 
defender actually rendering deficient performance to take particular steps to remedy the problem. 
The PDC certainly has no such power. 
Further, the Cronic case differs from the present case in that the Cronic case involved a 
post-conviction appeal for ineffective assistance of counsel. In the case before this Court, 
Appellants are seeking class status, for themselves and similarly situated individuals, in a case 
entirely separate from their respective criminal cases. Most, if not all, of the Appellants had not 
been convicted at the time of the lawsuit. The District Court explained that a post-conviction 
motion or appeal, such as was used in Cronic, is the appropriate procedure to redress Appellants' 
alleged injuries. Memorandum and Decision and Order Granting Motion, p. 25. (R., p. 492.) 
13 
the 
in a post-conviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. It could also be 
addressed preconviction. However, a favorable decision in the case before this Court against the 
PDC would not afford the Appellants any relief from any injury suffered. A favorable decision 
would not overturn any conviction (if any Appellant has received one), nor would it change the 
outcome of any initial appearance before their respective courts. A broad declaration by the 
District Court that the public defense system in Idaho is unconstitutional would not afford 
Appellants any relief from their claimed harm, nor would entering injunctions as requested by 
Appellants (which will be further addressed regarding separation of powers). 
As such, Appellants' harm, if any, cannot be redressed by the District Court in this case as 
to the PDC. 
C. Separation of Powers 
Coupled with the lack of standing, it would not be appropriate for this Court to take over 
the operation of the PDC when it has never previously had the authority to take the proposed 
actions. On basic principles of separation of powers, this case is not ripe for adjudication against 
thePDC. 
"The separation of powers doctrine embodies the concept that the three branches of 
government, legislative, executive and judicial, should remain separate and distinct so that each is 
able to operate independently." Sweeny v. Otter, 119 Idaho 135, 139,804 P.2d 308,312 (1990). 
"This concept of separation of powers was adopted as a guiding principle by the United States 
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Idaho's government. Article 
§ 1 provides that the power to pass bills is vested in the legislature. 
Article 3, § 15 provides that, "[n]o law shall be passed except by 
bill, ... " Read together, these three constitutional provisions stand 
for the proposition that, of Idaho's tl1ree branches of govemn1ent, 
only the legislature has the power to make "law." 
The Constitution of the state of Idaho and this Court, through its 
interpretation in the cases cited herein, have clearly established that 
the legislative power was vested exclusively in the legislature; that 
a statute or law should be enacted only by a bill, passed by both 
houses of the legislature and signed by the governor, or rejected by 
the governor, passed over the veto by the legislature, or having 
become law without the governor's signature as provided in the 
Constitution. 
Mead v. Arnell, 117 Idaho 660,664, 791 P.2d 410,414 (1990) (string citations omitted). 
Administrative agencies in Idaho are granted power by the Idaho legislature to enact rules 
and regulations. Id. "While the power to make law lies exclusively within the province of the 
legislature, (Idaho Constitution, art. 3 §§ 1, 15) 'the legislature may constitutionally leave to 
administrative agencies the selection of the means and the time and place of the execution of the 
legislative purpose, and to that end may prescribe suitable rules and regulations."' Id. citing State 
v. Taylor, 58 Idaho 656, 664, 78 P.2d 125, 128 (1938). 
As previously stated, the concept of separation of powers underlies the concept of standing. 
Not surprisingly, the problems that exist in Appellants' arguments regarding causal connection 
and redressability of their alleged injuries also relate to separation of powers in this case. Since 
the PDC had no enforcement, funding, or regulatory authority over the individual counties, any 
redress offered by the District Court in regard to the PDC would be usurping the powers of the 
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system m Idaho unconstitutional, such argument belies the actual relief requested in their 
Complaint. Appellants request injunctive relief in addition to a determination of constitutionality. 
Specifically, Appellants request that the District Court"[ e ]nter an injunction requiring the State to 
propose, for this Court's approval and monitoring, a plan to develop and implement a statewide 
system of public defense that is consistent with the U.S. Constitution and the Constitution and laws 
of the State ofldaho", to "[e]nter an injunction that requires the State to propose, for this Court's 
approval and monitoring, uniform workload, performance, and training standards for attorneys 
representing indigent criminal defendants in the State of Idaho in order to ensure accountability 
and to monitor effectiveness", and to "[e]nter an injunction barring the use of fixed-fee contracts 
in the delivery of indigent-defense services in the State of Idaho." Class Action Complaint for 
Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, p. 53. (R., pp. 6-54.) Such requests for relief go well beyond 
the judiciary' s powers under the separation of powers doctrine. Not only are Appellants seeking 
a declaration on the constitutionality of the public defense system in Idaho, they are asking the 
Court to revise existing law and enact new law. 
The PDC, as an administrative agency (with little administrative power), was granted its 
limited power by the Idaho legislature. Under current Idaho law, the PDC only has the power to 
promulgate rules regarding training and continuing legal education for public defense attorneys. 
It has no power to enforce those rules. Its only other power is to make recommendations to the 
Idaho legislature. Under House Bill 504, which was recently passed, the PDC will have some 
actual power to enact changes to the public defense system throughout the State of Idaho. 
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to even act 
Respondents Thomas and Wellman concede that the Court has the power to declare a law, 
or the application of a law, unconstitutional. However, none of the injuries allegedly sustained by 
Appellants are related to the PDC's actions. Until House Bill 504 goes into effect, the PDC can 
only promulgate rules relating to training and continuing legal education. Any injunctive relief 
from the Court regarding the PDC would go beyond the Court's powers. The PDC can only work 
within the confines of the Idaho Code, specifically the Idaho Public Defense Act. The Idaho 
legislature is the only branch of government that can delegate administrative powers to the PDC. 
IV. APPELLANTS' CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Appellants' claim for attorney fees on appeal against Respondents Thomas and Wellman 
should be denied. Appellants' claim for attorney fees is based on the Civil Rights Attorney Fees 
Act (42 U.S.C. § 1988) and ostensibly Idaho Code§ 12-121. 
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) provides that in an action to enforce a covered provision under the 
code, "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a 
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs ... " Similarly, Idaho Code§ 12-121 provides "In any 
civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party or parties ... " 
As indicated by the clear language ofboth 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) and Idaho Code§ 12-121, an award 
of attorney fees to the prevailing party is discretionary. 
"In the United States, parties are ordinarily required to bear their own attorney's fees - the 
prevailing party is not entitled to collect from the loser." Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. 
v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598,602, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 1839, 
17 
) 
a 
Buckhannon, 532 at 602, 121 S.Ct at 1839 quoting Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 
U.S. 809, 819, 114 S.Ct. 1960, 1967, 128 L.Ed.2d 797 (1994). 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) and Idaho 
Code § 1 121 give courts discretionary authority to award attorney fees to a prevailing party. 
However, such discretion is limited by the confines of the term "prevailing party." "[A] 'prevailing 
party' is one who has been awarded some relief by the court ... " Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603, 121 
S.Ct. at 1839. By enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1988, "Congress intended to permit the interim award of 
counsel fees only when a party has prevailed on the merits of at least some of his claims." Id. citing 
Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758, 100 S.Ct. 1987, 1989, 64 L.Ed.2d 670 (1980) (per 
curiam ). "Our 'respect for ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive at least some relief 
on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail."' Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603-4, 121 
S.Ct. at 1839-40 quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 2675, 96 L.Ed.2d 
654 (1987). 
In the case before this Court, Appellants are appealing the dismissal of their case due to 
lack of standing. Such an appeal, even if successful, deals merely with a preliminary, procedural 
matter in the case. The appeal does not address the merits of the case. Any decision by the Court 
would not give Appellants any relief on the merits of the overall matter. As such, an award of 
attorney fees to Appellants on appeal would be inappropriate under the standards outline above. 
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